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Abstract. The rst part of this paper is devoted to explaining what
key escrow is and why it exists, and attempts to put it into a historical
context. The subsequent focus is primarily on key escrow schemes which
will work in an international environment. The possibility of using con-
ventional key distribution techniques to provide key escrow services in
an international context is rst considered, and the associated problems
are explored. The `Royal Holloway' (RH) key escrow scheme is then de-
scribed in a way which is intended to clarify and motivate its design, and
the properties of this scheme and some related schemes are considered.
1 Introduction
In the last two or three years there has been an explosion of interest in the
`key escrow' problem. Most recently this has given rise to an announce-
ment from the US Government, and a simultaneous announcement from
a group of major manufacturers, that export restrictions on encryption
technology will be lifted for products incorporating key recovery facili-
ties.
The purpose of this paper is to explain what key escrow is and why
providing it is non-trivial (at least in an international context), and to
introduce a family of technical solutions. One motive for producing this
paper is to give a simple explanation of key escrow, and in so doing
counter some of the widespread misconceptions about the nature of key
escrow. To some extent these misconceptions arise from some of the
wilder statements made by those parties opposing the principle of key
escrow, often on extreme libertarian grounds.
Of course, what kinds of key escrow solutions should be implemented, if
any, is a practical and political question, and one which is beyond the
scope of this paper. The purpose of this paper is certainly not to argue
for or against the principle of key escrow, but to attempt to provide a
simple explanation of some of the technical issues. Only against such a
background can a measured debate about the rights and wrongs of the
use of the technology be played out.
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2 Key Escrow
2.1 Background
It is an undisputed fact that the rapidly growing use of public telecom-
munications and computer networks for sensitive and commercial appli-
cations argues strongly in favour of the widespread public use of crypto-
graphic techniques. Of course, serious arguments do exist about how far
we need to go in securing these networks, but these arguments tend to
be about the level of security required, rather than about the need for
any security at all.
The most fundamental services which can be provided by cryptographic
methods are condentiality and integrity protection for transferred and
stored data. We apply the term integrity protection to mean not only
protection against accidental or deliberate change, but also the provision
of means to verify the claimed origin of data. Integrity and condentiality
can be provided independently of one another, and indeed are typically
provided using dierent mechanisms.
Typically, integrity services will be provided by the use of a digital signa-
ture or a Message Authentication Code (MAC), and condentiality will
be provided by the use of encryption. For many commercial organisa-
tions, the primary security requirement is integrity, and condentiality
for transmitted data is at most of secondary importance. However, in
recent years there has been an enormous growth in the use of public
networks, in particular the Internet, for all kinds of applications, includ-
ing many for which condentiality is important. For example, encryption
is probably essential for the security of electronic commerce over pub-
lic networks; without condentiality protection for users' bank details, a
variety of frauds may become possible.
However, widespread encryption of user communications on an end-to-
end basis, i.e. encryption at source and decryption at destination with no
decryption between, presents a problem to police forces and other law en-
forcement agencies throughout the world. Currently, in many (probably
nearly all) countries, certain ocial agencies may intercept telecommuni-
cations trac, if so authorised by an appropriate legal process. Typically
a police force wishing to intercept the communications of a suspected
criminal can do so if granted a warrant from a judicial authority.
Note that, at least within the UK, such legal interception powers are non-
trivial to obtain. Typically, interception warrants will only be granted in
cases of serious crime, e.g. crimes for which the rst oence penalty would
be a prison sentence of a year or more. Once a warrant has been granted,
the collection of the intercepted data would normally be performed by
the network provider (e.g. a public network operator) acting on behalf of
the agency wishing to read the trac. The involvement of another third
party also helps make abuse of interception powers more dicult.
Obviously, the widespread use of encryption will nullify this interception
capability. Observe that integrity protection through MACs and digital
signatures is not a problem in this respect, since it does not threaten the
interception capability valued by law enforcement agencies world-wide.
We are thus presented with the problem of reconciling the legitimate
requirement of users and business for condentiality of communications,
with the requirements for legal interception.
2.2 Key escrow | a solution?
One solution to this problem, which has recently received very wide at-
tention, is to use a key escrow scheme. The idea of such a scheme is that
copies of the keys used by parties to encrypt their messages are lodged
with escrow agents, and that, when an agency is given authorisation
to intercept a particular user's communications, they can apply to the
appropriate escrow agent for a copy of that user's key. An escrow key
mechanism can then simply be regarded as a method of key generation
and distribution such that users are equipped with encryption and de-
cryption keys when they need them, and where all relevant escrow agents
also have access to a copy of decryption keys (in the event that they are
required by legally authorised parties).
We therefore arrive at the following `model' of a key escrow system, with
three types of entity involved:
1. Users are entities who wish to exchange condential messages,
2. Trusted Third Parties (TTPs), which can be further split up into
two, not necessarily disjoint, groups:
(a) TTPs oering trusted services (e.g. time-stamping and certi-
cation of public keys),
(b) and KEAs (generally known as Key Escrow Agencies or Key
Recovery Agencies) that provide a key management service to
users and also provide a key escrow/recovery service on demand,
3. and an Interception Agency which will make use of an escrow agency
to obtain keys when authorised to do so.
This is, of course, a simplied model. Corporate entities may also wish
to have the means to intercept encrypted trac going to or from their
employees, at least while it involves use of their equipment or commu-
nications facilities. In such an event companies, or parts of companies,
may t any or all of the above three roles (since companies may provide
the key management for their own private networks).
The notion of Trusted Third Parties acting on behalf of users, but within
a regulatory regime which requires them to divulge user secrets when
legally required to do so, is a familiar one. Most banks ll precisely
this role; they look after money for users, and will provide information
regarding nancial transactions to tax authorities when legally required
to do so.
In recent months a number of governments have suggested that they
will encourage the development of encryption products incorporating a
key escrow facility; in particular, the US Government has stated that
existing export controls for encryption products will be relaxed if escrow
is included. The current approach appears to be to encourage voluntary
adoption of such schemes, without forcing all users of cryptography to
adopt them. Thus the existing user of home-built encryption software can
carry on using it, even though it may not incorporate an escrow facility.
However, if international use is required, then the legal controls on the
export of encryption products will make use of such products much more
dicult. This primarily voluntary approach would appear to reduce the
threat perceived in some quarters regarding the loss of existing freedoms
to use cryptographic techniques.
One question that immediately arises in the context of voluntary (rather
than compulsory) use of escrow technology, is `Why bother if all the
criminals will not use escrowed technology'? There are a number of pos-
sible answers to this question, including, possibly, to admit that there is
no point in bothering! However, to see why this might not be the case we
need to examine in a little more detail how escrowed encryption might
be oered and used.
The main likely area of application for key escrow services is in public
data communications networks, such as the Internet and data transmis-
sion services using mobile telephony. We might expect to see end-to-end
encryption, with built in key management (and key escrow) support,
being oered by either the provider of the network, or by independent
network service providers. Commercial organisations, who may already
buy in certain network services, and who also wish to have a condential
communications facility, would then subscribe to one of these key man-
agement services for condentiality support. These organisations would
then enjoy the benet of secure encryption technology being available on
an international basis, whilst governments would be happy to allow free
export of the necessary hardware and software, safe in the knowledge
that interception using a key escrow service will be possible for their law
enforcement agencies.
Indeed, if all public networks oered a practically unbreakable encryption
service without any provision for key escrow, criminals would nd such
a service extremely useful, and it would remove a valuable weapon from
the armoury of those agencies which we collectively appoint, authorise
and pay to protect us against the actions of criminals. Faced with the
possibility of freely available encryption to all, governments are much
more likely to prohibit encryption altogether, and/or widen the use of
other, possibly more intrusive, methods of monitoring trac. Thus the
real alternative is probably not whether we use some kind of key escrow
or not, instead it is whether we have encryption with key escrow or no
public encryption service at all!
We can now attempt to answer the question as to why criminals would
use an escrowed network for their condential messages, since they would
surely be aware that law enforcement agencies could apply for a warrant
to decrypt their encrypted messages. There are a number of reasons why
we might expect this to happen.
{ Firstly there is the issue of convenience. It is to be expected that, at
some time in the not too distant future, all public communications
networks will oer an encryption option with automatic key man-
agement support. Criminals are likely to use such an option, even
if they know they may be intercepted, since they `might as well' (it
will cost them relatively little and will certainly not make life any
easier for the police!).
{ Secondly we have a point regarding history. Criminals have contin-
ued to use the public telephone and postal networks in full knowledge
of the possibility of interception. It seems rather unlikely that they
would avoid use of public networks with an escrowed encryption fa-
cility. Moreover, they may wish to communicate with non-criminals,
and in such a case they would be obliged to use standard network
facilities. Of course the sophisticated criminals will use their own
`unescrowed' encryption, but this should not, in itself, prevent soci-
ety from limiting the public availability of completely untouchable
encryption. Most criminals are not sophisticated!
Having considered two reasons why key escrow might continue to be a
valuable resource to society, we should also consider why anyone would
worry about the idea of key escrow, given that, in most countries, every-
one is already subject to telephonic and postal interception. The usual
answer of opponents is to suggest that this is one more step to a `big
brother' society. Whilst the prospect of constant electronic monitoring of
all aspects of our lives is certainly not a welcome one, the introduction of
key escrow does not necessarily do anything to bring this closer. Indeed,
its introduction will not enable the state to do anything it could not do
before, since the automatic collection of intercepted data is already an
established technology, and all escrow will do is enable the continued use
of such data for law enforcement purposes; indeed, it is possible to argue
that it is non-escrowed encryption which threatens the status quo.
Traditionally most European societies have managed to cope with the
necessary compromises between individual privacy and the need to give
the state certain limited powers to protect its population against serious
crime. Ultimately, the decision about where lines should be drawn is a
political one, and outside the scope of this paper.
It is interesting to note that arguments about the rights and wrongs of
key escrow often seem to mirror arguments about gun control. That is the
arguments revolve around the conict between individual rights to use a
technology, and the protection of society, particularly its weaker mem-
bers, against misuse of technology by criminal elements. One argument
against gun control, which precisely mirrors one of the arguments against
key escrow, is that criminals will bypass such legislation. Of course they
will, but there are still benets from preventing the open sale of weapons,
particularly in reducing armed crime. Of course, limiting the availability
of weapons is a major loss of rights for an individual, and each society
makes its own decision about the weight of the conicting arguments.
Finally note that there are other uses for key escrow technology, e.g. for
companies to recover their data which may have been encrypted by an
ex-employee who took the keys with them, which even some of the most
vocal opponents of key escrow recognise as being potentially valid. This
application is often referred to as key recovery, although the dierence
between key recovery and key escrow is not always clear; indeed it would
appear that in some circles the term key recovery is used instead of key
escrow. Certainly the idea that work on this technology is inherently a
bad idea, in the same way that one might argue that work on nuclear
weapons is immoral, now seems to be rather out of fashion.
2.3 The international key escrow problem
As we see below, while it would appear to be relatively straightforward
to design escrow systems which operate in a single domain (e.g. a large
country), with a single legal framework, international use presents a num-
ber of problems. Some of the most signicant problems are as follows.
{ There will typically be more then one intercepting body, normally
at least one per domain.
{ A legal warrant issued in one domain will typically have no validity in
another domain. Hence at least one escrow agent will need to exist
in every domain, so that every intercepting agency has an escrow
agent to whom they can pass a warrant.
{ Dierent domains will typically have dierent legal rules about to
whom and in what circumstances a warrant can be issued for legal
access to encrypted communications.
{ There may be a lack of trust between domains, making arrange-
ments applying to cross-border encrypted communications dicult
to dene and operate.
In Section 5 we consider how solutions to the international problem may
be devised.
2.4 Some historical background
For many years most western governments have sought to control crypto-
graphic technology. There are two major reasons for these controls, which
have mainly applied to ciphers rather than other types of cryptographic
technique. Note that this concentration on ciphers is both for historical
reasons (cryptography was the same as the study of ciphers until rela-
tively recently), and because of the fact that condentiality is the most
politically sensitive of the services which cryptographic techniques can
provide.
{ The rst reason relates to national security; in particular govern-
ments typically wish to intercept other countries' communications.
By limiting the export of equipment incorporating cryptographic
facilities to `friendly' countries, the objective is to ensure that un-
friendly countries use inferior ciphers, or perhaps none at all. This
can then lead to a decisive military advantage. The importance of
cryptography and cryptanalysis in war is well documented, partic-
ularly in the case of the second world war. Indeed, the needs of
cryptanalysts during the second world war played a major role in
the development of modern electronic computers, as testied by the
development of the ground-breaking Colossus machine at Bletch-
ley Park. There has also been a general desire to discourage public
research in cryptography; although much research in cryptography
has been conducted by academics and others since the 1970s, pre-
viously very little appeared in the public domain. Most developed
countries maintain signicant government-controlled interception,
cryptographic and cryptanalytic capabilities, e.g. at GCHQ in the
UK and at NSA in the US, whose research is most certainly not in
the public domain, although publication by members of these organ-
isations is not unknown.
In recent years there have been many eorts by those inside and out-
side the cryptographic community to attempt to discredit the export
controls that exist. It is certainly true that these controls have been
incapable of stemming the ow of encryption software across the
Internet, although laws are probably being broken every time these
pieces of software cross international boundaries. However, computer
experts who use such software are typically not the target of these
controls, and the export of encryption hardware, which is often of
key importance for military and paramilitary use, remains strictly
controlled.
{ The second reason for control stems from the need of government
agencies to intercept internal communications to combat crime. For
example, police routinely `tap' the telephones of suspected serious
criminals, when provided with appropriate warrants. Although it
would seem unlikely that a criminal would use a public communi-
cations network to discuss criminal activity, particularly when the
ability of the police to tap telephone trac is well known, apparently
they do, and the ability to tap telephone trac is seemingly highly
valued by law enforcement agencies.
In order to limit the ow of cryptographic technology around the world,
all implementations of cryptographic algorithms (hardware and software)
have been subject to COCOM-based export regulations (these regula-
tions have recently been replaced by the Wassenaar arrangement, al-
though the eect of these controls appears to remain much the same).
Since World War II these regulations have been very eective in limit-
ing access by certain states to sophisticated cryptographic equipment.
Whilst documentary evidence is very dicult to obtain, for obvious rea-
sons, there is strong anecdotal evidence that this policy has been enor-
mously helpful to western countries in a variety of conicts that have
arisen since 1945.
In parallel with this control of export of cryptographic technology, some
countries, e.g. France, have regulated the internal use of cryptography.
The main objective of these controls has been to limit the use of ciphers,
although the French law covers all cryptographic techniques. This has
met the needs of law enforcement agencies who wish to retain the right
to intercept trac. Other countries, e.g. the UK and US, have not reg-
ulated the internal use of cryptography, possibly because cryptographic
technology has not been widely available for use, and hence controls
have been unnecessary. However, with the growth in personal computers
and other cheap consumer electronics capable of performing sophisti-
cated cryptographic calculations, one might anticipate pressure in some
countries for the introduction of new legislative controls over the use of
cryptography, and in particular of ciphers.
In opposition to this is the growing legitimate need for end-to-end privacy
over public networks. If the Internet and other public networks, such as
mobile telecommunications networks, are to be used for commerce, then
in many cases privacy for condential user information is required. This
in turn creates a growing requirement for public use of encipherment
technology. This tension leads naturally to the topic of key escrow.
2.5 The development of key escrow
As far as the public domain is concerned, the history of key escrow started
as recently as 1993, with the proposal by the U.S. government of the
Escrowed Encryption Standard [19], EES, also known as the CLIPPER
scheme. This scheme, which we now briey outline, only attempted to
solve the problem for the US, and did not address the needs of users
wishing to have communications condentiality for trac entering or
leaving the US.
At the heart of the CLIPPER scheme was an encryption algorithm (the
SKIPJACK algorithm) devised by the NSA, and which was intended to
remain secret, although certain interface details were made public. De-
tails would obviously need to be released to selected integrated circuit
manufacturers, but these manufacturers would be required to commit
themselves to maintaining the secrecy of the algorithm. A range of prod-
ucts would then be developed incorporating the CLIPPER algorithm,
for use by anyone in the US needing condentiality for communicated
data.
To enable key escrow, all implementations of the algorithm were to in-
corporate `key checking' for all entered keys, i.e. checking that the key
contains redundancy according to a particular (secret) cryptographic for-
mula. How this was implemented is not clear, but it could have been
arranged by adding a cryptographic check value to each key, computed
using a secret key known only to the devisers of the scheme.
Whilst such a scheme is a reasonable candidate for use within a single
domain or country, it is less suitable for international use since it depends
completely on the secrecy of a single algorithm. Once the algorithm is
known to more than one entity, control of keys is lost, and the scheme
becomes unworkable. On the other hand, leaving the control of all keys
within a single country could never be widely acceptable.
In the remainder of this paper we therefore focus on other types of solu-
tion to the key escrow problem.
2.6 Key escrow and the public key infrastructure
Before proceeding it is worth spending a few moments distinguishing
between the Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) and TTPs providing Key
Escrow services. Since they are both TTP-based and provide security
services, it is easy to confuse the two; however the goals are typically
very dierent.
The purpose of the PKI is to provide a means of distributing public
signature verication keys on a wide, possibly global, scale. It is based
on the idea of a network of Certication Authorities (CAs), signing public
key certicates for individual users. These certicates consist of a copy
of the public verication key for that user, concatenated with the user's
name, an expiry date, and certain other information, all signed using the
CA's private signature key.
Anyone wishing to obtain the public verication key for another user,
rst obtains the public key certicate for that user, and then veries
the certicate using the public key of the appropriate CA. This yields
a veried copy of the user's public verication key, which can be used
to check digital signatures on messages originating from that user. The
certicates are typically, although not necessarily, distributed by means
of directories, which need not be trustworthy.
Thus the Public Key Infrastructure's primary role is to support the
widespread use of digital signatures. As such, it has been supported by
governments and business world-wide, since there is much to gain and
very little to lose from implementing global, secure, digital signatures.
It will make certain types of fraud much more dicult, yet it will do
nothing to interfere with the ability of government agencies to intercept
communications. In fact, this notion ts well with the US government
backed signature algorithm DSA, which has the great advantage that,
unlike RSA, it cannot be used for encryption.
Of course, in principle there is nothing to stop CAs signing certicates
containing public encryption keys instead of public verication keys, al-
though this is not the typical case. Such an idea is also likely to meet
with government resistance because typically it will not allow key escrow.
Key escrow, unlike the PKI, supports the widespread use of encryption,
and simultaneously allows warranted interception to take place. There
are many ways of providing key escrow, as we describe in the remainder
of this paper, but typically it involves a TTP handing over a user's
encryption key to an interception agency when warranted to do so.
It is important to stress that key escrow relates to encryption keys and
not signature keys. Some opponents of key escrow have, accidentally or
deliberately, muddied the waters somewhat by suggesting that govern-
ments wish to escrow signature keys. Not only is this not justied by
the evidence, but the fact is that the US and other governments have
actively promoted the development of the PKI, which is quite orthogonal
to the notion of key escrow. The development of the DSA standard can
be seen as a very deliberate eort by the US to promote a secure signa-
ture technique which avoids export restrictions by being a signature-only
algorithm, and can therefore be used world-wide; this is hardly the act
of a body wishing to restrict the use of signatures.
In fact governments and their law enforcement agencies have every reason
not to escrow signature keys. The worst possible scenario would be for
criminals to repudiate signatures on the basis that the government has
access to their private signature key, and therefore a government agency
must have forged their signature!
3 What do we want from a Key Escrow
System?
There are two main objectives/requirements for a typical key escrow
system.
{ Warranted interception, i.e. the ability of an interception authority
(typically a government agency) to obtain the means to decipher in-
tercepted enciphered messages and/or stored enciphered data, typ-
ically for law enforcement and/or protection of national security.
This is the main objective behind the CLIPPER proposal. Escrow
schemes can be used elsewhere by having other parties play the role
of the `authority', e.g. companies, organisations, private persons.
{ Data recovery, i.e. the ability to recover plaintexts from ciphertexts
in case of lost, damaged, or sabotaged keys.
3.1 Requirements for key escrow
There have been many papers and groups suggesting various require-
ments/constraints for key escrow systems. It is impossible to formulate
a single universally acceptable list, because the exact practical require-
ments will always be dependent upon the application of the system. In
this paper we will conne ourself to giving just one list. This is a draft list
of requirements produced by the UK Department of Trade and Industry
(DTI), which, although not ocial UK policy, indicates the direction of
DTI thinking on the role of TTPs in supporting key escrow services.
1 The framework should provide benets to the legitimate user.
2 It should provide for both national and international working.
3 It should be public and unclassied.
4 It should use well known techniques.
5 It should support all forms of electronic communication.
6 It should be compatible with the dierent laws and regulations of
participating countries concerning interception, use, sale and export.
7 It should not impede the due process of law and order. In particular,
it should allow near-real-time access when a warrant is held.
8 It should provide access under warrant (or other legally-constituted
form of authority) to both incoming and outgoing communications.
9 It should enable the sender to limit the length of time for which any
key is used.
10 It should provide for the use of a variety of cryptographic algorithms
whether in hardware or in software.
11 It should not enable those with a warrant to fabricate false evidence.
12 It should ensure that attempted abuse by the sender can be noticed
by the receiver.
13 It should not require a user to deal with a Trusted Third Party in
another country.
14 It should not require either regular or on-line communication between
Trusted Third Parties.
This list is clearly intended to apply to international solutions (see re-
quirements 2 and 13). The technical solutions we describe later in this
paper are intended to t, as much as possible, to this list, which we refer
to as the `DTI requirements' (although this is not meant to imply that
they are ocial DTI policy).
Before proceeding note that, since we are concerned only with escrowing
encryption keys, requirement 11 is not an issue here. Indeed, it is further
evidence to contradict any suggestion that there is a requirement to
escrow signature keys.
3.2 Types of warrant
In the rapidly growing literature relating to key escrow, there has been a
considerable amount of discussion regarding what the reasonable scope
of an interception warrant might be; note in particular [17, 18]. Such an
interception warrant would typically be issued by a judicial authority
to an interception agency, and will describe what access to users' com-
munications should be provided to this Interception Agency by a Key
Escrow Agency. Of course, the exact nature of the key escrow system will
determine what types of access can be readily provided, and hence un-
derstanding what types of warrant will be issued gives a very important
measure of the usefulness of a key escrow scheme.
The most typical warrant would appear to be one which relates to a single
communicating entity. Some authors suggest that it may be useful to be
able to support separate warrants for all outgoing communications from
this entity, and for all incoming communications to the entity. Others
suggest that `time-bounding' warrants is a very important requirement,
i.e. so that the interception agency is only given access to an entity's
communications for a specied period of time (e.g. if they are given a
key to decrypt enciphered communications, then it should stop working
when the warrant expires, and it should also not work with messages
sent prior to the start date in the warrant).
The DTI requirements list in Section 3.1 only explicitly species that
warranted access to all incoming and outgoing communications should
be possible (see requirement 8), without separating the two. It does also
refer to the need for a sender to be able to limit the time period for which
any particular key is used, which implies a type of time-bounding (see
requirement 9). We therefore restrict our attention mainly to the case
where warrants cover communications both incoming to and outgoing
from an entity, and where time-bounding may be a requirement. The
requirement for separate send and receive warrants seems unlikely to be
of much practical signicance.
Note that it is an implicit assumption of most key escrow schemes that
interception warrants only normally apply to communications either orig-
inating or terminating in the country (or domain) where the warrant is
issued. Although other possibilities have been considered in the litera-
ture, see, for example, [5, 6], we restrict our attention to this case. Even
in this case, there are two possibilities for the entity covered by a warrant:
{ the entity concerned is sending or receiving communications from
within the domain of the interception agency, in which case all that
entity's communications are covered by the warrant, or
{ the entity concerned is sending or receiving communications from a
dierent domain to that of the interception agency, in which case
only those communications which originate or terminate within the
interception agency's domain are covered by the warrant.
Of course, these two possibilities are not mutually exclusive, given that
users may migrate from one domain to another during the lifetime of
a warrant; however, to simplify the discussion, we treat the two cases
separately here. Finally observe that the rst case can be considered as
the `most typical'.
3.3 Types of solution
Almost all of the proposed solutions to the key escrow problem adhere to
a model similar to that described in Section 2.2, i.e. where TTPs act on
behalf of both users and interception agencies. Again it is generally the
case that these TTPs provide key management and/or key generation
services for users, whilst at the same time providing keys to interception
agencies (to enable decryption of intercepted messages). There are then
two main ways in which such a key management scheme can work:
{ the encryption algorithm is xed and secret (typically implemented
in some kind of secure hardware), and only works with keys of a
certain secret form (e.g. the Clipper scheme), or
{ the encryption algorithm is not xed, and the key management sys-
tem simply arranges for the distribution of keys which may be used
in a variety of algorithms.
The advantage of the rst type of scheme is that it prevents abuse, in
that users have no alternative but to use ocially issued keys, i.e. keys
which are known by the Escrow Agency. The main disadvantage is that
it prevents use by a multiplicity of TTPs in dierent domains (since each
TTP needs to know how to generate keys), and hence is not suitable for
international use.
The main problem with the second type of scheme is that it opens up
the possibility of abuse, i.e. of users making use of part or all of the key
management scheme in order to establish a shared secret key for enci-
pherment, but to `distort' the scheme in such a way that the escrow agent
does not have the correct key to decipher the encrypted communications.
This is a possible problem we discuss further in Section 5.3 below.
Given that we are interested in solutions which can work in an inter-
national environment, we do not consider further escrow schemes of the
rst type (i.e. which are based around a specic secret algorithm), and
we restrict our attention to solutions of the second type from this point
on.
4 Possible solutions using existing key
distribution methods
In this section we examine solutions to the key escrow/recovery problem
based on existing techniques for key management. We look at solutions
in the light of international use and identify some problems involved with
the use of these methods.
4.1 Symmetric cryptography
Probably the most common solution to the problem of key distribution
using symmetric cryptography is for the network(s) to provide a special
type of TTP known as a Key Distribution Centre (KDC), i.e. a trusted
network resource that shares a key with each subscriber and uses these
in a bootstrap process to provide additional keys to the subscribers as
needed. When one subscriber wants to communicate securely with an-
other, he/she rst contacts the KDC to obtain a session-key for use in
that particular conversation. The KDC then generates a session key and
provides the means for both users to obtain a copy of this in a way which
preserves its condentiality.
Key distribution protocols vary widely depending on the cost of mes-
sages, the availability of multiple simultaneous communications, whether
the subscribers have synchronised clocks, and whether the KDC has au-
thority not only to facilitate, but also to allow or prohibit, communica-
tions. In the discussions below we sketch two key distribution protocols;
these are not complete specications in that we ignore the provision of
entity authentication, an important aspect of key distribution. However,
depending on what methods are used for timeliness, e.g. time-stamps or
unpredictable nonces (i.e. `challenges' used only once), data items can be
added to the messages specied (and, if necessary, preliminary messages
added), to make the protocol provide mutual entity authentication. For
details of how this can be achieved see, for example, ISO/IEC 9798{2
and 11770{2, [12, 13]).
The protocols described are intended to be `typical' examples of key dis-
tribution protocols based on symmetric cryptographic techniques. How-
ever, as we explain in the accompanying discussions, minor adaptations
have been made in order that they can also support key escrow.
The idea of modifying conventional symmetric cryptography based key
distribution protocols to support key escrow services is certainly not a
new one. In Denning's on-line catalogue of key escrow systems, [7], which
is a companion document to Denning and Branstad's taxonomy, [8], a
number of mechanisms of this type are listed, including `Die Time-
Bounded Clipper' (1994), `Leiberich Time-Bounded Clipper' (1994), and
`PC Security Stoplock' (1995).
Single domain with single TTP The following example applies
to the case where a single domain with a single TTP is involved. We
suppose A wishes to send B a condential message, where both A and




respectively) with a KDC.
1. A calls the KDC and requests a key for communicating with B.
A  ! KDC : A;B
2. The KDC responds by sending A a pair of tokens. Each token con-
tains a copy of the required session key K
S
, one encrypted so that
only A can read it, and the other so that only B can read it.












denotes the symmetric encryption of data X using key
K. A can immediately decrypt the rst token and obtain the session
key K
S
, to be used between A and B.
3. When A wishes to send a secret message M to B, A encrypts it
under the session key, and sends it with both tokens to B.














B uses the second token to recover K
S
, the session key needed to
decrypt M .
4. Both tokens should also be sent with all subsequent messages (from
A to B) which are encrypted using the same session key K
S
.
First note that the above protocol diers from a `typical' mechanism of
this type (see, for example, [13]) in two respects. First it would normally
only be necessary to send the second of the two tokens with the encrypted
message in step 3. Second, in subsequent uses of the same session key, it
would normally not be necessary to send any tokens. These two (minor)
dierences are present to allow for key escrow. Of course, even without
the transfer of both tokens the interception agency could decrypt the
messages with the assistance of the appropriate KDC (as long as the
KDC retains a copy of the session key), although we wish to consider
schemes here that involve the minimum interaction between Interception
Agencies and KEAs (as in DTI requirement 7).
Now suppose that the KDC is also licensed to act as a Key Escrow
Agency. To be able to decrypt the communications between A and B,
the Interception Agency will rst need to obtain a warrant giving it per-
mission to read either all A's communications or all B's communications.
Once the Interception Agency has obtained this warrant, it presents it




, depending on who the
warrant covers. Armed with this key, and given any intercepted message,
the appropriate token accompanying the message can be used to obtain
the session key and decrypt the message.
The scheme, as described, does not permit time-bounding of warrants.
However, this is not dicult to add to the scheme. One way of achieving
this is as follows. Instead of using K
A
to encrypt the token for A, the
KDC uses a `daily' key S
A
, which is computed as a (public function) of
the date and the key K
A
, e.g. using a one-way hash-function; session keys
are also changed at least once per day. Given a time-bounded warrant
valid for a set period of days, the appropriate set of `daily' keys could
then be computed in advance and passed to an Interception Agency, but
these keys would not be of any use in decrypting messages sent at other
times.
Multiple domains The previous scheme is unsuitable for use in more
than one domain, since it uses a single TTP, but can be extended for use
with multiple TTPs in multiple domains, and might even be suitable for
international use. It operates as follows, where we suppose that A and
















As previously, we suppose A wishes to send B a condential message.
1. A sends T
A
a request for a key for communicating with B (and an







responds by sending A a pair of tokens. Each contains a copy
of the required session key, one encrypted so that only A can read
it and the other so that only B can read it. The encryptions are



























































are values (identiers) uniquely identifying A and B, and f is a one-




(f could be public and
globally used). A rst obtains the key K

A
, and then decrypts the
rst token to obtain the session key K
S
.







`typical' protocol of this type would simply use K
A
to encrypt the





to encrypt the second token; we make these
minor changes both to permit key escrow and to reduce the amount
of communication between B and T
B
.
3. When A sends a secret message M to B, A encrypts it using the
session key, and sends it with both tokens to B:
















4. When B receives the encrypted message and tokens, there are two
possible cases to consider (we assume that B knows which TTP A
is using). If B already knows K

B
(which is a function only of the
identity of T
A























, and sends it back to B:
T
B







B can now recover K
S
and use it to decrypt the message from A.
6. Both tokens should also be sent with all subsequent messages (from
A to B) which are encrypted using the same session key K
S
.
First note that the above protocol diers from the `typical' mechanism of
this type in several minor respects. First, as we have already observed, the








respectively. Second, as for the previous mechanism,
it would normally only be necessary to send the second of the two tokens
with the encrypted message in step 3, and, in subsequent uses of the
same session key, it would normally not be necessary to send any tokens.
These dierences are present to allow for ecient key escrow, i.e., as
previously, we wish to avoid the Interception Agency having to enlist
the assistance of the KEA to decrypt every intercepted message. In fact
these changes seem to improve the eciency of the protocol at minimal
cost even if key escrow is not required, and might usefully be considered
for more general adoption.
Now suppose that the KDCs are licensed to act as Key Escrow Agencies
in their respective domains. To be able to decrypt the communications
between A and B, the Interception Agency will rst need to obtain a
warrant giving it permission to read either all A's communications or
all B's communications. Once the Interception Agency has obtained this
warrant, there are four cases to consider.
{ If the Interception Agency is in A's domain and has a warrant to






(this enables reading of all trac from A to any user
making use of the KDC T
B
).
{ If the Interception Agency is in A's domain and has a warrant to










{ If the Interception Agency is in B's domain and has a warrant to










{ If the Interception Agency is in B's domain and has a warrant to






(this enables reading of all trac to B from any user
making use of the KDC T
A
).
Armed with the appropriate key, and given any intercepted message, the
appropriate token accompanying the message can be used to obtain the
session key and decrypt the message.
The scheme, as described, does not permit time-bounding of warrants.
However, as with the previous scheme, it is not dicult to add time-








Evaluating the mechanisms We now briey consider how well
these two schemes meet the DTI criteria, and how ecient they are.
If we note that A can ask for a new session key whenever he/she wants
(see DTI requirement 9), the protocol deals purely with encryption (see
requirement 11), and that no real-time inter-TTP communications are
required in either case (see requirement 14), the second protocol appears
to have the potential to meet all the DTI criteria, with the possible ex-
ception of requirement 12, since the recipient has no means to check that
the rst of the tokens is sent correctly. The rst protocol meets all the
criteria except numbers 12 and 13 (this latter requirement fails since the
protocol only makes use of a single TTP).
As far as we are concerned here, the issue of `eciency' relates to the
number of messages that need to be exchanged to support use of the
protocol, particularly messages between a user and his/her TTP. In both
mechanisms, A needs to exchange messages with his/her TTP to set up
communications with B. In the rst mechanism B has all that he/she
needs to read the message without further exchanges with the KDC;
however, in the second protocol an extra exchange between B and B's
TTP may be required to read the message.
The system could become rather unmanageable for very large global
networks, because the TTPs are directly involved in setting up all com-
munications, and hence are likely to become a signicant bottle-neck. Of
course these problems apply just as much to unescrowed secure networks
where key management is based on the use of symmetric cryptography.
Also note that every pair of TTPs will need to have access to a shared
encryption algorithm. If the scheme were to be used on a global scale,
this in itself could present signicant implementation diculties.
Despite these reservations, it should be clear that symmetric crypto-
graphy based mechanisms have the potential to meet all but one of
the main requirements for an escrow scheme. The main limitations are
the usual limitations of symmetric cryptography based key management
schemes, i.e. the need for on-line access to TTPs by both sender and
recipient.
In the remainder of this paper we consider ways in which the use of asym-
metric cryptographic techniques can be used both to reduce the number
of message exchanges, and, perhaps most importantly, to reduce the need
for on-line communications between a user and a trusted third party (and
hence reduce the `bottle-neck' problem). Typically, the use of asymmet-
ric cryptography allows the substitution of an untrusted distributor of
certicates for the on-line TTP required when symmetric cryptography
is used for key distribution. As we shall see, this result extends, at least
partially, to the case where the key distribution mechanism also needs
to support key escrow.
4.2 Asymmetric cryptography
We start our discussion of public key based schemes by considering the
usefulness of conventional asymmetric cryptography based key distribu-
tion techniques for supporting key escrow.
We assume the reader is familiar with the notion of asymmetric or pub-
lic key cryptography, as introduced in 1976 by Die and Hellman [9].
Public-key encryption is usually based on dicult number theoretic prob-
lems (e.g. factoring, discrete logarithms), which involve computationally
complex calculations with large numbers. Thus public key encryption of
entire messages is typically too time-consuming, and so it is common to
employ a combination of symmetric and asymmetric cryptography. For
condentiality purposes, the message is (symmetrically) enciphered with
a randomly generated session key, and this `short' session key is (asym-
metrically) enciphered with the public encryption key of the receiver.
The asymmetrically enciphered session-key is sent along with the enci-
phered message. On delivery, the receiver can use his private decryption
key to nd the session key, and hence decrypt the message.
By setting up a directory of certicates of users' public encryption keys
it is possible to set up a communication infrastructure allowing any two
users to communicate securely. This would be precisely analogous to
the Public Key Infrastructure referred to in Section 2.6, with certicates
containing public encryption keys instead of public verication keys.
In order to allow warranted interception we could require all Certication
Authorities to obtain and store a copy of every user's private decryption
key before they sign the user's public encryption key. This private key
could then be handed over to an interception agency in possession of
an appropriate warrant. The agency could then use it to obtain all the
session keys used to encrypt messages sent to a specied entity.
There are two problems with such an approach. The rst is that obtain-
ing a specic private key will involve approaching the appropriate CA,
which might reside in a dierent domain from that where the intercep-
tion warrant is issued. This breaches DTI requirement 13, i.e. the use of
this type of scheme does not permit international operation.
The second, even more fundamental, problem with this approach is that,
while it is ne for providing warranted access to all the condential mes-
sages received by a specied entity, providing warranted access to all
messages sent by a specied entity is much more dicult. This is be-
cause each message to a dierent recipient will be protected using a
dierent public key (i.e. the public key of the recipient). This leaves the
interception agency with no choice but to approach the escrow agent with
a request for the session key for each intercepted message, an approach
which will become hopelessly inecient and will, in most cases, breach
DTI requirement 7.
US PublicKey Infrastructure (Clipper III) A recent, unocial
draft of the US Interagency Working Group on Cryptographic Policy [20]
envisions a form of key escrow incorporated in a government-sponsored,
voluntary PKI, usable for both condentiality and integrity. The PKI
itself would be supported by private-sector key-management organisa-
tions (certifying authorities). These would also hold in deposit private
encryption keys, and will operate within performance standards set by
law. Thus, they serve as a Key Escrow Agency (KEA).
This type of scheme is very much of the category we have just discussed,
and hence one problem with this scheme, which will aect its usage on
an international basis, is that the receiver's private key is needed for
the decryption, not the sender's. Thus, if someone suspected of criminal
activities sends a message to a `good user', law enforcement require co-
operation of the receiver's KEA to decrypt the message with the good
user's private key. This is exactly the type of problem we have just con-
sidered. Indeed, this type of solution would appear to fail to meet DTI
requirement 7.
To use this scheme internationally would require co-operation between
the receiver's KEA and the law-enforcement agency in the sender's coun-
try, which, in general, would be impractical. As we have already seen,
this would appear to rule out this type of solution in an international
context.
Thus what we require are new types of public key solution allowing key
escrow in an international context, as well as permitting simple warranted
access to both sent and received messages. We can achieve this through
the notion of separate `send' and `receive' key pairs, as we describe in
the next section.
5 New types of solution
We now describe a series of key distribution mechanisms allowing key
escrow, all based on the use of public key cryptography. The schemes have
been designed to work in dierent operational environments. We start
with the simplest scheme, which applies to a single domain environment.
Before proceeding observe that all the mechanisms we describe here are
variants of the Die-Hellman key agreement mechanism, [9]. We there-
fore assume that there is a globally agreed (large) prime p, and also a
globally agreed primitive root g in the multiplicative group of non-zero
elements in Z
p
. All calculations are performed modulo p.
We assume that the parameters are chosen so that the discrete loga-




computationally infeasible to nd an s such that g
s
= h mod p.
5.1 Single domain solutions
The concept of a domain can be likened to (and generally is considered
the same as) a country. This domain can contain just one or multiple
TTPs. We assume that there exists some level of trust between all TTPs,
and that a single legal framework covers the whole of the domain.
Our model for single domain solutions is a simple one. We assume that
there are a number of TTPs. Each interception agency is able to com-
municate directly with every TTP, and there exists an agreement be-
tween each interception agency and each TTP that the TTP will give
up the appropriate data when presented with a warrant by the intercep-
tion agency. This could, for example, be achieved by requiring TTPs to
operate within a legally backed regulatory framework.



















All the private keys are registered with the user's TTP (T
X
) prior to
certication, and hence prior to use of the scheme. Certicates of the send
and receive public keys are generated and marked as valid for encryption
(certicates marked as valid for signature will be treated separately, and
the private keys should denitely not be lodged with any TTP). We
suppose that the certicates for all receive public keys are put into a
universally available directory, and that all TTPs cross-certify each other
and put all their cross-certicates in this directory; by this means any
user can obtain the public receive key for every other user. In addition
we suppose that every user is given a copy of the certicate for their
own public send key; label the certicate for X's public send key P
s
(X)







(X)). Note that this notation is not
meant to imply that certicates only contain a copy of a user's public key;
at minimum they must also contain an identier for the key's owner, and
typically they will also contain an expiry date, an algorithm identier,
and other relevant information.
We now consider how the scheme will be used to provide key manage-
ment for message encryption. We subsequently describe how warranted
interception will operate. We suppose that user A (with TTP T
A
) wishes
to send a condential message M to user B (with TTP T
B
).




mod p) of the recipient
B, and can get it either from a directory, or directly from B's TTP (T
B
).
A then uses its own private send key (S
s



























encrypts the message using K
S
, and sends the following message to B:





















When B receives this message, B rst veries the certicate to obtain a






mod p. B then combines this
with B's private receive key S
r







B can then use this to decrypt the session key K
S
, and thence decrypt
the message M .
B uses the supplied value P
r
(B) to determine which of its private receive
keys should be used to compute the shared secret key with A. Note that,
unlike the symmetric mechanisms described in Section 4.1, this mecha-
nism does provide DTI requirement 12, because (implicitly or explicitly)
B checks all the key data sent with the encrypted message.
To see how warranted interception operates we simply observe that
knowledge of any user's private send and receive keys will immediately
enable all messages sent or received by that user to be decrypted (since
all the necessary public keys are always sent with a message). This is
the reason for introducing separate send and receive keys. Thus, if an In-
terception Agency has a warrant to intercept A's communications, then
this warrant is passed to A's TTP T
A
. The TTP then hands over A's
private send and receive keys, which can then be used to provide access
to all A's in- and out-going messages.
As described, the mechanism does not provide time-bounding of war-
rants. Of course A and B can request new send or receive key pairs
whenever they wish, giving a certain measure of time-bounding. How-
ever, to introduce a more sophisticated method of time-limiting warrants,
we need to rst describe the multi-domain version of the mechanism (see
below).
In general, the mechanism oers a signicant advantage over the cor-
responding symmetric cryptography based mechanism in reducing the
possibility of TTP bottle-necks, since none of the TTPs need to be on-
line and all public keys are distributed by means of certicates.
Finally we observe that this mechanism is not appropriate for a multi-
domain environment. This is because we assumed that the interception
agency had access to all the TTPs, which will not be the case in an
international environment (see DTI requirement 13). As we see below,
to solve this we introduce a key-derivation technique similar to that used
in the symmetric crypto based multi-domain mechanism introduced in
Section 4.1.
Note that the single domain case is where most of the work in the public
domain lies, but unfortunately much of these results are not very useful
in the international case. The harder problems would appear to lie in
devising multiple domain solutions that are both ecient and secure,
and this problem is what we next consider.
5.2 Multiple domain solutions
The boundary line between solutions designed to operate in multiple
domains within a single country, and international solutions is very ne.
It can be argued that multiple domain and international key escrow
schemes both have the same requirements. Fundamentally, international
solutions do not rely on there being trust between domains, and need to
be exible enough to allow cooperating domains (countries) to implement
dierent cryptography polices on the domestic and international use of
encryption in a coherent way.
The need for key escrow systems which support international use is by
now well documented. In addition to the original papers describing the
RH scheme, [14, 16], the 1995 paper of Frankel and Yung, [10], discusses
such a need. We now describe the RH scheme in the context of our
previous discussions.
The Royal Holloway scheme The scheme which has become known
as the Royal Holloway (RH) Scheme was rst described in a pair of pa-
pers presented at conferences in 1995, [14, 16]; an elaborated description
of the scheme was presented in [15]. We specify the scheme here as a nat-
ural evolution of the schemes we have already described, in an attempt
to clarify the motivation behind its design.
If we consider the Die-Hellman based scheme described in Section 5.1,
it is straightforward to see that one obstacle to its use in an international
context is that the sender does not have an obvious means to obtain the
recipient's receive public key. However, if the receive public key is a
function of a key shared between TTPs (as in the second mechanism
described in Section 4.1), then the sender's own TTP can provide the
necessary information. This is the basis of the RH scheme, which we
now describe.
We suppose that the TTPs acting as KEAs are trusted by their users
and by the interception authority in their domain. We let T
X
denote the
trusted third party of user X. Just as in Section 5.1, we suppose that
each user has two public/private key pairs, a send key pair and a receive
key pair. Again, just as before, every user's send key pair is registered
with their own TTP, and the TTP retains a copy of the private send key
and generates a certicate for the public send key. The only dierence
is that the receive key pair for any user is a deterministic function of a
secret key shared by a pair of TTPs, as we now describe.
Suppose A (with TTP T
A
) wishes to send a secret message M to B
(with TTP T
B
). Analogously to the second mechanism in Section 4.1,









, and have also
agreed on a Die-Hellman key generation function f , which on input of
a key K and an identity value ID
X
returns a secret receive key for user X.
Then, the secret receive key for user B (for use when receiving messages
from clients of TTP T
A












a value uniquely identifying user B.
Observe that this means that a dierent receive key pair will be needed
for each TTP from whose clients a user wishes to receive mail.
We can now describe the protocol. We use identical notation to that
established above. We suppose that, when A chooses his/her TTP, a








mod p), and that
T
A
generates a certicate for P
s
(A) and passes it to A (T
A
also retains
a copy of S
s






1. A sends a message to T
A






generates the private receive key for B (for receiving messages











) and computes the











(B) to A via an authenticated channel. Note that
this channel does not need to be condentiality preserving, and hence
the key could be sent in a certicate via a `regular' communications
channel. In fact the key could even be generated in advance and
lodged in a public (not necessarily trustworthy) directory. Of course,
there does need to exist a secrecy-preserving channel between A and
T
A
for the transfer of A's private key whenever it is changed, but
this will typically occur relatively infrequently (e.g. once a week).








generates a random session key K
S
(for encrypting M), and sends


















(B) is present both to enable key escrow and to enable
B to determine which of its private receive keys should be used to
construct the shared secret with A.








This provides the means to decrypt K
S
and thereby recover M .
First note that B only really needs to verify the Certicate for A's public
key if the `shared secret key' K(A;B) is to be used to support integrity
protection as well as condentiality protection. Note also that if B is
going to verify the certicate for A's public key, then B needs T
A
's public
verication key. Thus, should certicate verication be needed, on the
rst occasion that B receives a message from a client of T
A
, B will need
to ask his TTP to provide an integrity protected copy of T
A
's public
verication key. This could be achieved by sending a certicate via a
`regular' communications channel, or via a public directory.
It is worth remarking at this point that the scheme is very similar to
the single domain public key solution. As we have already mentioned,
the only signicant dierence is that every entity's receive key pair is a
deterministic function of a key shared by two TTPs.
To see how escrow works we need to consider four cases.
{ If the Interception Agency is in A's domain and has a warrant to
intercept all A's messages (or at least all messages sent by A), then
the warrant is passed to T
A
, who hands over S
s
(A). This enables all
messages sent by A (to any domain) to be read, by combining the
secret key with the public key sent with the encrypted message. This
explains why the TTP T
A
needs to be equipped with A's private
send key S
s
(A); if this key was not in the possession of T
A
then
escrow would be much more dicult to achieve (and would have to
be handled on a recipient by recipient basis).
{ If the Interception Agency is in B's domain and has a warrant to
intercept all B's messages (or at least all messages received by B),
then the warrant is passed to T
B
, who hands over S
r
(B). This en-
ables all messages received by B (from clients of T
A
) to be read, and
thus T
B
may need to hand over a selection of such keys, one for each
TTP from whose clients B may receive messages.
{ If the Interception Agency is in A's domain and has a warrant to
intercept all B's messages (or at least all messages received by B),
then the warrant is passed to T
A
, who hands over S
r
(B). This enables
all messages received by B from clients of T
A
to be read.
{ If the Interception Agency is in B's domain and has a warrant to in-
tercept all A's messages (or at least all messages sent by A), then the
warrant is passed to T
B
, who can only help by providing individual
shared secret keys.
Thus escrow is relatively simple in all but the last case. Given that the
rst two cases are much more likely to occur than the last case, we can
say that DTI requirement 7 is `mostly' met.
The scheme, as described, does not permit time-bounding of warrants,
except that all entities can change their send key pairs as often as they
wish. To enable receive key pairs to be changed regularly, which will
provide the desired time-bounding, is simple to arrange. When comput-
ing receive private keys as a function of a TTP shared secret and an
identity, a date stamp can also be added into the scope of the function,
which means that every day a dierent receive key will be generated au-
tomatically. This idea is already described in [14, 15]. Note that there is
a performance penalty associated with time-bounding, which increases
as the time-bounding granularity becomes ner, since every new secret
receive key needs to be transferred to its owner.
The above scheme also appears to meet all the DTI requirements. Re-
quirement 9 is met by allowing the sender to change their key whenever
they wish. Requirement 12 is met because, as in the previous mecha-
nism, B checks all the elds in the received message (either implicitly or
explicitly).
We conclude by comparing the mechanism with the symmetric mech-
anisms of Section 4.1. Although the general communications structure
is closely analogous to the second mechanism in Section 4.1, there are
the expected eciency gains we would expect from using a public key
solution. Notably, the communications between the sender and his/her
TTP could be `o-line', i.e. the required public key could be obtained via
a directory, and also the message recipient has a minimal need for com-
munication with his/her TTP (the recipient needs only contact his/her
TTP for new receive key pairs, which could be done on a daily or weekly
basis). There is also only a need for a shared key between TTPs, and
not a shared encryption algorithm. Finally, the RH mechanism meets
all the DTI requirements, which is not quite the case for the symmetric
mechanisms.
A variation on the RH scheme We now consider a variation on
the RH scheme; note that other variations, including support for `split
escrow', have been described in [15]. We suppose now that both the send
and receive key pairs for every entity are deterministically generated as
a function of keys shared between pairs of TTPs. In fact this means that
the send and receive key pairs can actually be the same, and so from
now on we just refer to the key pair for user X, written (S(X); P (X) =
g
S(X)
mod p). This also means that all key pairs are specic to the TTP
of the user who is to be communicated with, i.e. every user will have a
set of key pairs, one for each TTP with whose clients the user wishes to
exchange secret messages.
This variation of the RH scheme thus has the advantage that the keys
produced can be used for two-directional communications (this would not
be so simple for the `standard' RH scheme because a receiver's TTP has
no direct way of nding the sender's public send key). Moreover the TTPs
do not have to archive the secret keys of their users. It does have the
disadvantage (by comparison with the RH scheme) that the users initially
have no method of controlling exactly when the values of their secret send
keys are changed. However, this is not an abnormal situation: mobile
phone users and users of many current encryption/security products, do
not have any control over the values of their keys.
The denitions used in the revised scheme are almost the same as before.
We suppose that A (having TTP T
A
) wishes to send a secret message
M to B (with TTP T
B
). We also suppose that, in advance of the use
of the protocol, A is equipped by T
A
with key pairs (and public key
certicates) for use with clients of a variety of TTPs (including T
B
). To
simplify the description below we suppose that (S(A); P (A)) is A's Pri-
vate/Public Key pair for use in exchanging messages with clients of T
B
,
and (S(B); P (B)) is B's Private/Public Key pair for use in exchanging
messages with clients of T
A
.
The protocol operates as follows.
1. A sends a message to T
A
that he wants to communicate with B (who


















now sends P (B) to A via an authenticated channel (as pre-
viously this would typically be by means of a certicate, or even
conceivably via an untrusted third party).
3. A computes a shared secret key as
K(A;B) = P (B)
S(A)
mod p;
generates a random session key K
S











(P (A)); P (B)
4. B veries the certicate containing A's public key and computes
K(A;B) = P (A)
S(B)
mod p. This provides the means to decrypt
K
S
and thereby recover M .
As with the `standard' RH scheme, B only needs to verify the certicate
for A's public key if K(A;B) is to be used to support authentication as
well as encryption, and, in this case, B will need to be provided with
T
A
's public verication key.
Escrow works even more simply than for the `standard' scheme. In each
of the four cases described above, the TTP concerned can hand over the
appropriate private key for the entity named in the warrant.
One possible shortcoming in the scheme is that a sender now has no
control over their key pair, and cannot change it `at will' (see DTI re-
quirement 9). However, by including a date stamp within the scope of the
function used to compute private keys, all key pairs are automatically of
time-limited validity, and hence the scheme can be made to support full
time-bounding (and, to all intents and purposes, DTI requirement 9).
Another possible shortcoming is that every user must store a number of
key pairs, one for each TTP with whose clients they wish to exchange
secret messages. Whilst this is not ideal, this is already largely true for
the `standard' RH mechanism, since every user of that scheme must store
a receive key pair for each TTP from whose clients they wish to receive
secret messages.
In terms of eciency, the protocol is very similar to the previous scheme.
Like the previous scheme, the sender of a message will need to obtain
the recipient's public key from an on-line entity (at least the rst time
a message is sent), although the recipient will normally have all that
he/she needs to process a received message.
5.3 Cheating
One method of modelling a general class of key escrow schemes based on
a public key infrastructure, derived from [4], is to divide an encrypted
communication into four components.
C1 The actual message encrypted with a symmetric encryption algo-
rithm, using a random session key K
S
.
C2 The session key K
S
encrypted using the public key of the receiver.
C3 The session key K
S
encrypted using the public keys of one or more
TTPs.
C4 Other data.
Generally a user will encrypt the session-key under the public keys of the
receiver, the sender's TTPs and the receiver's TTPs. These TTPs, who
are able to decrypt the message but are not actually sent the message,
are known as virtual addressees. It is also possible to add more virtual
addressees to the message, for instance TTPs in any domain through
which the encrypted message travels (although in this case the sender
must know the route that messages take), making this a fairly exible
concept.
Not all these components may be present in each of the current key es-
crow schemes. For instance those schemes that escrow the user's secret
keys, e.g. the RH scheme (and its variations), tend to have no C3 compo-
nent since the TTPs already have access to the appropriate secret key(s).
In fact the RH scheme does not t this model very well, since the RH
scheme is a combined key escrow and key distribution scheme, and has
meeting DTI requirement 1 as one of its objectives.
This model is the basis of several key escrow systems: TIS-CKE [1, 24],
IBM SecureWay [11], AT&T CryptoBackup and many others, and has
the advantage that the users do not have to deposit secret key informa-
tion with KEAs beforehand. The exibility of choice of TTPs also makes
it suitable for use in the international environment.
Although this approach is very exible, unfortunately it is not fraud-
resistant. Its main drawback is that only the TTP and receiver can check
whether the third component actually contains the correct session key;
and the TTP can only detect this fraud after a lawful wiretap. Hence, by
sending random data in place of C3, unilateral abuse is possible. This
can be prevented by the addressee's client software recalculating and
validating C3 before decryption. However abuse by colluding of sender
and receiver, through a one-time manipulation of the software, is still
possible.
In [22] and [23], the authors address this problem using a novel concept
called Binding cryptography. They add a fth component (C5), to the
communication, which contains `binding data', with the idea that any
(third party) monitor who has access to components C2,C3 and C5 (but
not any additional secret information) can determine whether the session
keys encrypted in C2 and C3 are the same, but not actually obtain any
information on the actual session key. How eective this scheme will be
in preventing cheating remains to be seen.
Finally we note that attempting to prevent `cheating', while useful, is
always likely to be of limited value, since once there is an infrastructure
supporting the provision of authenticated channels between users, any
pair of users can establish a shared secret key without any support from
TTPs simply by using Die-Hellman key agreement.
5.4 Variations to t dierent environments
We now briey consider two other possible requirements on key escrow
schemes. Firstly note that, within the context of international commu-
nications, it is possible that some countries may not want encrypted
information crossing their jurisdiction without them having access to de-
crypt it. Obviously, this is a matter of policy agreement between the
domains concerned, although we note that it is unlikely to be a very
common requirement.
Indeed, such a requirement is specically ruled out by the ITU rules. To
quote from ITU (1992) CV/Article 40 on Secret Language (para. 506):
Members which do not admit private telegrams in secret lan-
guage originating in or destined for their own territory must let
them pass in transit, except in the case of suspension of service
provided for in Article 35 of the constitution.
Nevertheless there may in certain special circumstances be a need for
key escrow schemes which support it.
Very few of the schemes which have so far been published address this
problem, with the exception of TIS-CKE [1, 24], and the scheme in [6].
The TIS-CKE scheme operates using the notion of virtual addressees.
More generally, if we consider the components C1{C4 of encrypted mes-
sages, as introduced in the previous section, it is fairly easy to add extra
encryptions within component C3 to enable Law Enforcement authori-
ties in any domain that the encryption may pass through to decrypt it.
Obviously the sender is going to have to know the route that the message
takes beforehand.
Secondly observe that it has been suggested that, to make key escrow
more costly and hence restrict its use, the communicating parties should
retain (and not escrow) a variable amount of the key material needed
for message recovery. This retained key material must then be recovered
by the Interception Agency by exhaustive search techniques. Ideas of
this type have been explored in [2, 3, 21], and in [11] this is called the
residual work factor. This option could be used to increase the overall
workload involved in key recovery so as to discourage `casual' recovery
requests and/or to inhibit `mass decryption' of communications. This
would typically be implemented by giving the KEAs all but, say, 40 bits
of the session-key, thus requiring the interception authority to do an
exhaustive search over the remaining bits.
One major problem with such an idea is how to decide the amount of key
material retained. If it is too small then there is little point. If it is large
enough to make a dierence, then it will impede the legal process. It
would seem that this requirement is also unlikely to become a common
one, since the only parties to gain would be the manufacturers of the
computing equipment necessary to search through the large numbers
of keys involved. Instead of putting articial hurdles in the way of the
legal interceptor, a better solution might be to ensure that the legal
and auditing processes involved in providing access to both intercepted
messages (typically involving a network provider) and escrowed keys (via
the KEA) prevent simple abuse. In fact, whilst the bulk of network trac
and stored data remains unencrypted, as will probably be the case for
some years to come, the main threat is not large scale key escrow but
large scale interception of unencrypted trac!
6 Conclusions
We have described the purpose of key escrow schemes and certain fun-
damental properties which such schemes are likely to need to satisfy.
We have considered how we might adapt conventional key management
schemes to provide key escrow and key recovery services. We have ob-
served that, in an international escrow context, whilst adapting symmet-
ric cryptography based key management schemes results in potentially
usable mechanisms, using a conventional certicate-based key distribu-
tion infrastructure (based on asymmetric cryptography) is not really ap-
propriate. This latter observation, combined with a desire to avoid some
of the network bottle-neck problems associated with symmetric key man-
agement methods, led us to a description of a family of technical solutions
based on use of the Die-Hellman key agreement scheme. These solu-
tions, which are all variants of the RH scheme, have certain advantages
over the symmetric cryptography schemes, although in some cases these
advantages may not be terribly signicant.
We have not attempted to provide an exhaustive list of all proposed
mechanisms; there are by now a large number of such mechanisms, de-
signed to meet a range of possible user requirements. For a list of mecha-
nisms the interested reader is referred to the excellent survey by Denning
and Branstad, [8]. It is likely that new mechanisms will continue to be
devised, particularly given that the operational use of these schemes is
likely to grow rapidly in the next few years.
Finally, if key escrow is to become a useful part of the secure networks of
the future, then one major challenge will be to integrate key escrow tech-
niques into secure network protocols (e.g. SSL and Secure IP) and secure
distributed applications (e.g. MOSS and Internet Payment Protocols).
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